ABSTRACT When the eavesdropping channel has a certain correlation with the legitimate channel, the physical layer key is susceptible to eavesdroppers. To ensure the security of the secret key, we propose a two-layer secure (TLS) quantization algorithm in this paper. First, we model the correlation between the distance and the channel correlation and derive the joint probability density function of channel phase and the key capacity. Then, we describe the detail of the TLS algorithm and prove the validity of our algorithm. Finally, we evaluate the performances of the TLS quantization algorithm using two parameters-key rate and bit disagreement rate. The Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer key generation aims to implement the information-theory secure by exploiting the characteristics of temporal varying, spatial decorrelation, and reciprocity of wireless channels [1] - [4] . In key generation technology, two legitimate users simultaneously measure the same noise channel, through which channel parameters that are highly correlated but not completely consistent can be obtained. Next, the legitimate users quantize the measured channel parameters to bit sequences, but the sequences are usually different due to channel variations between noise and observation intervals [5] , [6] . Therefore, both the sender and the receiver need to correct the disagreement bit in the sequence through information reconciliation [7] . Finally, the information leaked during the information reconciliation process is deleted through the privacy amplification process [8] .
The time-varying, spatial decorrelation, and reciprocity of the wireless channel guarantee the validity of the secret key. The time-varying of the channel is the main source of randomness for the physical layer key caused by the motion of objects in the environment. Channel reciprocity means that the signals at each end of the same link have identical statistical features, and reciprocity is the basis to generate the same key. The spatial decorrelation indicates that the characteristics of the wireless channel in different spatial locations are unique and cannot be replicated, ensuring that the secret key is not wiretapped by the eavesdropper. However, some studies and experiments have shown that under certain circumstances, wireless channels may lose the characteristics of spatial decorrelation [9] - [12] . In addition, eavesdroppers may try their best to approach legitimate users in order to wiretap secret key. And the eavesdropping channel is correlated with the legitimate channel when the location of the eavesdropper is close enough, resulting in the reduction of key capacity. In [13] , the influence of the statistical characteristics of the eavesdropper on the key generation scheme is tested under an indoor environment, and it is found in the experiment that the channel may still be correlated even distance between the eavesdropper and the legitimate user outside the half-wavelength. In [14] , the influence of channel correlation between the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper channel on the key capacity is considered. Moreover, the channel sparsity model is proposed in this paper, and calculates the key capacity which considering the influence of eavesdroppers. Reference [15] proposes a correlation model of eavesdropping channel based on Rayleigh channel model, and analyzes the influence of sampling delay, eavesdroppers location, Doppler spread, and pilot length on channel correlation.
Most of related studies just propose correlated channel model, and analyze the influence of eavesdropping on key capacity. But no study proposes the scheme to solve the corresponding problem. When eavesdropping channel is correlated with legitimate channel, legitimate users and eavesdroppers will extract correlated information from the channel and generate key. How to determine which information is stolen by the eavesdropper and to eliminate the information is still a problem. Most of the existing studies assume that the eavesdropper maintains passive eavesdropping state. Therefore, the location of the eavesdropper cannot be determined, and the channel correlation as well as the influence of the eavesdropper cannot be estimated. In addition, the effect of correlated eavesdropping channel on key generation scheme which based on channel phase information (CPI) and received signal strength information (RSSI) is unknown.
Aiming at the above problems, we propose a two-layer secure quantization (TLS) algorithm for physical layer key generation in this paper. Firstly, according to the actual situation of the existing research and communication system, we introduce the correlated eavesdropping channel model, and use the information theory and random signal analysis theory to derive the key capacity based on the channel phase in the model. Then we propose the idea of TLS algorithm on the basic of phase information distribution and channel correlations: Quantizing the channel phase and dividing it into two layers of bit sequences according to the risk of eavesdropping. What's more, we use the first and second layer sequence as reconciliation information and key sequence to generate secret key, respectively. Finally, we evaluate our algorithm by parameters of key rate and bit disagreement rate. The effects of eavesdropping channel correlation and signal-tonoise ratio (SNR) on the security performance of the scheme are analyzed. The results show that our algorithm improves the security performance of the secret key with correlated eavesdropping channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model of correlated eavesdropping channel and proposes the problem in this model. Section III presents the proposed algorithm and evaluates the performance of algorithm. Simulation results are given in Section IV. Finally, some conclusions are given in Section V.
Notation: Lower case letters and bold lower case letters denote scalar and vector, respectively. (·) † denotes the conjugate transpose, and E{·} is the expectation operation.
II. MOTIVATION
A. SYSTEM MODEL The key generation model based on eavesdropping channel correlation is shown in Fig.1 , including two legitimate users and an eavesdropper, Alice, Bob and Eve. They are all equipped with a single antenna and work in time-division duplex (TDD) mode. In this model, the channels are quasistatic Rayleigh channels, and the channel gains are invariant during the coherence time and are independent over the coherence time. The channel between Alice and Bob is called legitimate channel. According to reciprocal of channel, the uplink and downlink channel gains of legitimate channel h ab and h ba are identically distributed and highly correlated, h ab , h ba ∼ CN (0, σ 1 2 ) . The correlation function between h ab and h ba is given as
It is assumed that Eve is located near Bob, so the eavesdropping channel between Alice and Eve is correlated with the legitimate channel. Alice and Bob cannot get the location and CSI of Eve, but they make sure there is no Eve in the circular area with Bob as the center and radius d. For the secrecy of the generated key, we consider the location of Eve in the worst point, where the correlation coefficient between eavesdropping channel and legitimate channel is highest outside the circular region. The highest correlation coefficient is ρ ae (d), h ae ∼ CN (0, σ 1 2 ). According to the definition of correlation, ρ ae (d) is given as
where J 0 (·) is a zeroth-order Bessel function of the first kind and λ is the length of waveform. Although Eve can rely on methods such as approaching legitimate users to make the eavesdropping channel correlated, generally speaking, the correlation is difficult to exceed the reciprocity of the main channel, that is ρ ab > ρ ae (d) .
In this paper, we use the correlation between channels to analyze the performance of the scheme and the influence of eavesdropper.
For measuring the channel, Alice sends the pilot sequence S to Bob, Eve can also receive the S. The received signal at Bob and Eve can be written as
and Bob also sends the pilot sequence to Alice. Similarly, the received signal at Alice can be written as
where n a , n b and n e are i.i.d additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with variance σ 0 2 at the receiver Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively. Alice, Bob and Eve can then estimate the channel gain using Zero Forcing method aŝ
Note thatĥ ab is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with variance σ 1
||S|| 2 , and similarlyĥ ba andĥ ae are zero mean Gaussian random variable with variance σ 1
Assuming that the transmission power is P and the length of S is L. We have ||S|| 2 = PL. And the SNR of the channel is
Then the SNR of ZF estimation iŝ
Becauseĥ ab ,ĥ ba andĥ ae are complex Gaussian variable, they can be expressed aŝ (8) where A ab and ϕ ab are the amplitude and phase ofĥ ab , respectively.
B. PROBLEM PROPOSING
This paper design a quantization algorithm with the correlated eavesdropping channel based on the channel phase information (CPI). It is because the CPI has the characteristics of easy estimation and convenient quantization, most key generation schemes are designed based on CPI. However, the existing research on key generation with eavesdropping channel only analyzes the key capacity based on channel CSI, but has not studied the key capacity of RSSI, CPI and other information. In order to provide important reference for the quantization algorithm, the key capacity of the CPI with correlated eavesdropping channel is analyzed in this section.
Before analyzing the key capacity of CPI with correlated eavesdropping channel, we first introduce the key capacity of CPI which eavesdropping channel is unconsidered. In [16], the joint probability density function (PDF) of the uplink and downlink channel phases is solved by using the Jacobian determinant, and further determining the key capacity of channel phase in the narrowband channel. The joint PDF of the channel phase is
where σ s 2 denote the variance of channel phase and σ s 2 = γ +1 2 σ 0 2 . We further derive the key capacity C ab (ρ ab ,γ ) between the ϕ ab and ϕ ba , because the C ab (ρ ab ,γ ) is not considered in the eavesdropping channel correlation, which is referred to herein as the legitimate channel key capacity. (10) where h(ϕ ab ) and h(ϕ ba ) are marginal density functions of ϕ ab and ϕ ba , respectively. According to the nature of the complex Gaussian distribution variable, ϕ ab and ϕ ba are subject uniform distribution, and their marginal density functions are both expressed as h(ϕ ab ) = h(ϕ ba ) = 1 2π . Similarly, according to ρ ae (d), the joint PDF and mutual information between h(ϕ ab ) and h(ϕ ae ) can be obtained as
where C ae is the key capacity that is leaked to Eve, called the eavesdropping key capacity. According to the conclusion in [15] , the key capacity with correlated eavesdropping channel can be derived from (10) and (11) as
The effects of ρ ae (d) on key capacity are shown in Fig. 2 . It can be seen from the figure that the key capacity is affected 26482 VOLUME 7, 2019 by the eavesdropping channel correlation. However, according to the assumptions of this paper, the system still is part of key capacity of security. Then we design a quantization algorithm discards the CPI eavesdropped by Eve and retains the CPI that only be extracted by Alice and Bob.
III. TWO-LAYER SECURE QUANTIZATION SCHEME
In this section, we describe the TLS quantization algorithm. First, we present the TLS quantization algorithm in detail. Then we prove the validity of our algorithm and evaluate its performance.
A. DESCRIPTION
The ϕ ae is correlated with ϕ ab and ϕ ba when eavesdropping channel is correlated with legitimate channel. However, there is high probability that ϕ ab and ϕ ba are closer than ϕ ab and ϕ ae , due to ρ ab > ρ ae (d). We propose to quantize ϕ ab and ϕ ba in the same interval without ϕ ae , and the details of the algorithm as follow 1) Before transmission, Alice and Bob confirm the security distance d which means the closest distance between Eve and legitimate users. We write the d as
where d 1 and d 2 denote the security distance of Alice and Bob, respectively. 2) Both Alice and Bob send the pilot sequence to each other, then they estimate their respective CPI ϕ ab , ϕ ba , SNRγ and channel correlation ρ ab . 3) Alice and Bob set two quantization levels L 1 and L 2 .
They first quantize ϕ ab , ϕ ba with quantization level L 1 , which is called first layer quantization, and gets the bit sequencesX L 1 ,Ŷ L 1 and the remaindersφ
4) Then Alice and Bob quantizeφ
ba with quantization level L 2 , which is called second layer quantization, and gets the bit sequencesX
5) The 2, 3, and 4 are repeated until the length ofX L 2 andŶ L 2 are equal to the secret key length (fixed at 128, 256 bits, or more). 
B. VALIDITY OF ALGORITHM
In this section, we use the bit disagree ratio (BDR) to analyze the secure of first layer sequence and second layer sequence, and prove the TLS quantization algorithm is valid to deteriorate eavesdropper. As the analysis in Section II, that channel correlation and SNR are the two main factors affecting key capacity. Because we assume that Alice, Bob and Eve have the same environmental SNR, then the advantage of Alice and Bob is that the their channel correlation is higher than Eve. As shown in Figure 3 , the surface plot of the CPI joint PDF with 0.1, 0.9 and 0.99 correlation coefficients, respectively. It can be observed from the Figure 3 that the phase combinations (ϕ ab , ϕ ba ) located near the function ϕ ab = ϕ ba is more possible if correlation coefficient is high. And the (ϕ ab , ϕ ba ) located over the entire plane is more possible if correlation coefficient is low.
Since ϕ ab , ϕ ba and ϕ ae are uniformly distributed over the [0, 2π ), we use uniform quantization algorithm to extract secret bit, and take the 2-bit uniform quantization algorithm as an example for analysis which shown in Table 1 . We denote b 1 and b 2 as the high bit and the low bit of the 2-bit uniform quantization algorithm, and draw the quantization area of b 1 and b 2 as Fig.4 
It is obviously the P D1 is lower than P D1 , and we can conclude that b 2 is more susceptible to eavesdropping than b 1 . Similarly, the BDR of first layer sequences are higher than the BDR of second layer sequences, and the second layer sequences are more difficult to wiretap for the eavesdropper. Even if the BDR of second layer sequences are higher for legitimate users, as long as they are below a certain threshold, we can remove the disagreement bits through the information reconciliation process to generate the same secret key. Fig.5 shows the BDR of different bits in 4-bit unique quantization algorithm with 0.9, 0.99, 0.999 correlation coefficients and confirms our analysis.
C. ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The TLS quantization algorithm has been proposed in Section III. A, but how to select the appropriate L 1 and L 2 in different correlations and SNR is still a problem. In this section, we evaluate the performance of algorithms with different quantization levels through three performance parameters, and provide reference for TLS quantization algorithm.
1) KEY RATE
In TLS quantization algorithm, Alice and Bob extract the key fromφ
ba , and we denote their joint probability density function is g ρ ab (φ
There is a many-to-one mapping between ϕ ab , ϕ ba andφ
Then we write the joint PDF ofX
and the achievable key rate R ab (ρ ab ,γ ) is
Since the key negotiation information is transmitted on the channel, the quantization algorithm and the quantization levels are also publicized to Eve, so Eve can also use the TLS quantization algorithm to obtain the sequenceŶ Z 2 . Similarly, we can write the eavesdropping key rate as
where the
Similar to (12), we derive the key rate of TLS quantization algorithm as
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2) ALICE-BOB BIT DISAGREEMENT RATIO AND BOB-EVE BIT DISAGREEMENT RATIO
In most related work, the BDR of initial bit is also a parameter to evaluate the performance of the quantization. The high BDR between Alice and Bob indicates that the quantization method is more susceptible to random channel noise. Meanwhile, the low BDR between Bob and Eve indicates the quantization is susceptible to eavesdropper. We denote the P ab and P ae as Alice-Bob BDR and Bob-Eve BDR, respectively.
where T ml is the number of error bits when sequence x m is observed by Alice but sequence z l is observed by Bob. Defining the distance between the m and the l as
where d ml = min [., .] chooses the smaller number, the T ml can be expressed in terms of d ml as
, if d ml = 3 and s ml = 5 + 4k 3, if d ml = 3 and s ml = 5 + 4k 1, if d ml = 5, 7 and s ml = 9 + 8k 3, if d ml = 5, 7 and s ml = 9 + 8k 2, if d ml = 6 and (s ml = 8 + 8k or s ml = 10 + 8k) 4, if d ml = 6 and (s ml = 8 + 8k and s ml = 10 + 8k)
where s ml = m + l, and k is a positive integer. From the analysis of (23), it can be seen that there is a negative correlation between the number of quantization levels and BDR. Increasing L 1 or L 2 will result in a decrease in BDR.
D. QUANTIZATION LEVELS CALCULATION
Because there is a trade-off between key rate and bit error rate, it is impossible to find the optimal solution for these three performance indicators at the same time. Therefore, we set the key rate threshold R 1 as well as the eavesdropping rate key threshold R Eve , and calculate the quantization level that minimizes the BDR under the condition that the key rate is higher than R 1 and the eavesdropping key rate is lower than R Eve . The following steps describe in details of the algorithm:
1) Alice and Bob confirm the value of ρ ab , ρ ae (d),γ ,
If condition 1 is satisfied when condition 2 is unsatisfied, Stop the calculation and go to the next step. 4) Alice and Bob adjust the L 1 = L 1 + 1.
5) The steps of 3 and 4 are repeated until the quantization levels are outputed.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we prepare the performances of TLS quantization algorithms with Multi-bit Adaptive Quantization (MAQ) in [17] and 4-bit, 1-bit unique quantization through simulation. We carry out the Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate the effectiveness of theoretical analysis, and repeat 50000 times for each simulation. 6 shows a comparison of the Alice-Bob and Eve-Bob BDR between different quantization algorithms under the same channel conditions. It can be seen from the figure that the TLS quantization algorithm can effectively improve the Bob-Eve BDR and Alice-Bob BDR remaining below 0.05. The Bob-Eve BDR is close to 0.5 in high SNR, which ensures the security of the second layer sequence. Both Alice-Bob BDR and Eve-Bob BDR of 1-bit unique quantization are low, and their probability of eavesdropping is higher than other quantization algorithms. The Alice-Bob BDR of 4-bit unique quantization is so high in low SNR that error bit correction is difficult. The TLS and MAQ algorithm both dynamically change the quantization levels, but MAQ cannot classify CPI according to ρ ae (d) so that Bob-Eve BDR of MAQ is lower than our algorithm. Fig. 7 shows a comparison of the key rate of different quantization algorithms under the same conditions. It can be VOLUME 7, 2019 observed from the figure that TLS quantization algorithm has a lower key rate than the MAQ because the part of key rate is discarded in the first layer sequence, but the secure performance is improved. The key rate of 1-bit unique quantization decreases only a little with the increase of SNR for the eavesdropper estimating CPI more accurately. And the rate of 4-bit unique quantization approaches the upper bound when γ = 20dB its fixed quantization level. Fig. 8 shows the relationship between the Alice-Bob BDR, Eve-Bob BDR and the eavesdropping channel correlation coefficient. It can be seen from the figure that the TLS quantization algorithm has significantly improved security in different eavesdropping channel correlation coefficients. However, as the correlation of eavesdropping channel is improved, the Eve-Bob BDR is also reduced, and the security of the key cannot be fully guaranteed. The MAQ algorithm, 1-bit and 4-bit unique quantization algorithm do not consider the eavesdropping channel correlation, so the Alice-Bob BDR remains unchanged in the same ρ ab and γ . While TLS quantization algorithm changes the quantization levels as the eavesdropping channel correlation coefficient, the Alice-Bob BDR is reduced nearby ρ ae (d) = 0.83.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes the TLS quantization algorithm for the problem of secret key security decrease when eavesdropping channel is correlated with legitimate channel. The algorithm quantizes the channel phase and divides it into two layers of bit sequences according to the probability of eavesdropping. Then we use the first layer sequence which has higher probability of eavesdropping as error checking information to transmit on the public channel, and use the second layer sequence to generate secret key after information reconciliation and privacy amplification. The simulation verifies that the TLS presents better performance for key generation with correlated eavesdropping channel.
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